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Abstract
According to the dominant view, the later Wittgenstein identied the mean-
ing of an expression with its use in the language and vehemently rejected any
kind of mentalism or intentionalism about linguistic meaning. I argue that
the dominant view is wrong. The textual evidence, which has either been
misunderstood or overlooked, indicates that at least since the Blue Book
Wittgenstein thought speaker’s intentions determine the contents of linguis-
tic utterances. His remarks on use are only intended to emphasize the het-
erogeneity of natural language. Taking into account remarks written after
he nished the Investigations, I show how Wittgenstein anticipated the ba-
sic tenets of Gricean intention-based semantics. These are, in particular, the
distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ meaning and the distinction
between what a speaker means by an utterance and what the expression
uttered means in the speaker’s natural language. Importantly, Wittgenstein
also believed that only the meaning of the speaker determined the content of
ambiguous expressions, such as ‘bank’, on a particular occasion of utterance.
1 Introduction
My goal in this paper is to argue for two theses:
1. The later Wittgenstein did not endorse the theory that the meaning of a
word is its use in the language.
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2. The later Wittgenstein was an intentionalist about representation and mean-
ing and endorsed the basic tenets of contemporary intention-based seman-
tics.
These are controversial claims. Importantly, (1) is not merely based on the notion
that Wittgenstein endorsed a ‘no-theory theory’ of everything since then (2) would
be compromised. The arguments for (1) and (2) are motivated on both exegetical
and philosophical grounds. The independent motivation for (1) is roughly that use
can only ‘determine’ meaning in an epistemological sense—knowing the use (or
a use) of an expression e is a good way for hearers to gure out or discover the
meaning of e on a particular occasion of utterance. A related argument is presented
against the idea, often attributed to Wittgenstein, that meaning can be determined
by the context of utterance.
For the purposes of this paper, intention-based semantics is the idea that the
meanings of linguistic expressions are best explained in terms of certain proposi-
tional attitudes, most importantly Gricean communicative intentions. The content,
then, of what is said and meant by a speaker who utters a linguistic expression
is determined by the intentions with which the speaker utters the expression on
an occasion. Specications of the linguistic meaning of the expression-type itself
are, then, just generalisations over the communicative intentions of a group of
speakers. Thus expression-type e means, for a group of speakers G, what members
of G are disposed to intend by uttering e. The linguistically encoded meaning of
e can also be described as a set of constraints on what a speaker can reasonably
intend by its utterance. But it is not my purpose here to go into the ner details
of this type of theory.1
In §2, I show that Wittgenstein had an intentionalist view about representa-
tion at least since the Blue Book (BB). There, he hints at two distinct arguments
against a certain behaviouristic misconception of intentions. I develop these argu-
ments more fully, but they are commonly misunderstood as revealing behaviourist
predilections. In §3, I turn to the so-called use-theory of meaning. I develop three
arguments against such theories, the last of which, I argue, is explicitly endorsed
by Wittgenstein in the Investigations. The others seem to have worried him but
to a lesser extent. Next (§4) I argue that Wittgenstein’s early, post-Tractarian
ideas about the context-sensitivity of linguistic meaning cannot be accommodated
within use-based semantics. Furthermore, I provide textual evidence from Remarks
on the Philosophy of Psychology II for interpreting Wittgenstein’s mature theory
of representation as fully intentionalist and therefore a striking anticipation of
modern theories of pragmatics as instigated by Paul Grice (1957). This perspective
clearly goes against the current majority view of Wittgenstein scholars.
1The claim is merely that Wittgenstein endorsed the basics of intentionalism about language
and communication. See, for example, Grice (1957); Neale (1992, 2005); Schier (1972, 1987, 2003);
Wilson and Sperber (2012).
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2 Behaviourism and regress arguments
There have been serious debates among scholars about whether Wittgenstein
was a behaviourist.2 I will not address that issue directly. Undeniably, however,
Wittgenstein does formulate a kind of methodological behaviourism in the BB. It
is common to distinguish reductive behaviourism from eliminative behaviourism.
The former refers to the idea that mental phenomena, such as thought, belief and
desire, are reducible to physical and behaviouristic phenomena. The latter refers
to the idea that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as folk-psychological
thoughts, beliefs or desires: these are simply part of an obsolete theory of the folk,
similar to witches, elves and gods. Wittgenstein’s methodological behaviourism
is not nearly as contentious, although he ultimately does not endorse it.
He points out that theorists are prone to introduce certain specic mental
processes in order to explain, for instance, linguistic comprehension. Thus, theorists
are tempted to think of linguistic signs simply as inert material objects that acquire
some distinctive signicance by way of mental acts of interpretation. It is not until
sentences are thought, meant, understood and interpreted by human beings that
they acquire meaning. Further, these mental acts take place in some ‘queer medium’
known as the mind. The reason this medium is ‘queer’ is simply that, by denition,
it has eects that no mere material mechanism could have. An alleged example of
this is the fact that one can mentally wish for something that will never happen
(BB, 3–4).
At this point Wittgenstein proposes a methodological principle bearing the
insignia of behaviourism. I reformulate it here in terms that are not quite faithful
to his own notorious strictures against generalizations and theories in philosophy:
(P) Any mental process S must be such that S can in principle be replaced by
an equivalent physical process S′ without this having any signicant conse-
quences for our overall theory.3
The principle is similar to one which Wilfrid Sellars explicitly endorses in Empiri-
cism and the Philosophy of Mind, asserting that, regardless of whether mentalistic
concepts reduce to behaviouristic concepts, he will at least ensure that this is true
of the concepts that he will employ in his investigation (1997, §56). An example
of Wittgenstein’s will explain the import of (P). One might believe that in order
to understand an utterance of the expression ‘red’ one must entertain a red image
in one’s mind.4 But then merely looking at a red piece of paper should be able to
serve the exact same purpose. Thus, it seems, every imaginative process can easily
2For example, Bloor (1999); Hacker (1990: 224–253); Luckhardt (1983).
3Cf. BB, 4: ‘There is one way of avoiding at least partly the occult appearance of the processes
of thinking, and it is, to replace in these processes any working of the imagination by acts of looking
at real objects.’
4Of course, Wittgenstein rejects the claim in question. More on this below.
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be replaced by some process of looking at a picture and every process of thinking
silently can be replaced by a process of thinking out loud.5
Remember, however, that at least one reason why Wittgenstein abandoned the
so-called picture theory of meaning, which he endorsed in the Tractatus (TLP),
was the realisation that a single picture can be meant in many dierent ways.
Thus one cannot hold that a picture, which is a physical, non-mental object, is
intrinsically representational: it must be intended in a specic way (PR, §24).6
For instance, a single portrait can be intended to represent dierent individuals
on dierent occasions. This prompts Wittgenstein’s remarks, in the BB, about
intentional representation (BB, 32–34). As I see it, he imagines a philosopher who
endorses a behaviouristic theory of intention and interpretation: ‘Whenever we
interpret a symbol in one way or another, the interpretation is a new symbol added
to the old one’ (BB, 33). The theory is as follows:
(T) IntendingX by uttering expression e consists in entertaining some expression
e′ as the interpretation of e (where possibly e = e′).
Wittgenstein suggests, but does not give the details of, two arguments. The rst is
a regress argument directed at (T) and the second seems to be directed at (T) and
(P) at the same time.
Here is my reconstruction of the Regress argument, where ‘interpretation’ is
behaviouristically dened as adding one expression to another—either in the imag-
ination or as a physical process in accord with (P).
5Wittgenstein’s attitude to (P), however, is ambivalent. He even forgets sometimes that (P) can
only be a methodological assumption and does not really amount to any kind of description of our
ordinary linguistic practices. This occurs at a crucial point in §1 of the Investigations. Wittgenstein
imagines that someone goes shopping with a slip of paper marked ‘ve red apples.’ He then hands
the note to the shopkeeper who proceeds to open a drawer marked ‘apples,’ look up the word ‘red’
on a colour chart, and count from one to ve. For each number he picks up one apple the colour of
which ts the colour on the chart. Wittgenstein, surprisingly, claims that it is ‘in this and similar
ways that one operates with language’. But this claim is certainly false. Shopkeepers do not use
colour charts to nd red apples and neither do they go by words written on a drawer. If the drawer
marked ‘apples’ only contained oranges the shopkeeper would not have taken the oranges. One
major point of this example, for Wittgenstein, is to illustrate that linguistic comprehension can be
described without mentioning the meaning of any expression used. Even if that claim turns out to
be true a more realistic example would be needed for it to be established. For some plausible ways
of doing this, see Lewis (1969) and Skyrms (1996).
6PR, §24 reads:
How is a picture meant? The intention never resides in the picture itself, since, no
matter how the picture is formed, it can always be meant in dierent ways. But
that doesn’t mean that the way the picture is meant only emerges when it elicits a
certain reaction, for the intention is already expressed in the way I now compare
the picture with reality.
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Regress argument
1. Every expression and every picture can be intended dierently on dierent
occasions.
2. If intending X by uttering expression e consists in interpreting e with e′
(where possibly e = e′) nothing is intended unless e′ either has intrinsic
meaning or is intended some way or other by the speaker.
3. By (1), e′ does not have intrinsic meaning and must therefore be intended
some way or other by the speaker.
4. The speaker’s act of intending e′ will, by (T), consist in interpreting e′ with
e′′ (where possibly e′ = e′′).
5. Thus there is a vicious innite regress of intentions.
6. Therefore (T) is false.
This argument is valid and sound. Wittgenstein makes his case by example. A
pointing gesture or an arrow can be intended in a way that is opposite to the
usual interpretation. This intention, according to (T), consists in an added mental
gesture pointing in the opposite direction, which leads to a vicious regress. Thus,
Wittgenstein writes: ‘And this process of meaning, of whatever kind it may be, can
be represented by another arrow (pointing in the same or the opposite sense to
the rst)’ (BB, 33).
Notice that the Regress argument does not tell against principle (P). The argu-
ment could not establish a vicious regress with respect to (P), as (P) only involves
the idea that a mental process S must in principle be replaceable by an equivalent
physical process S′. And even if every such replacement can in turn be replaced
ad innitum ordinary people are not actually required to replace any process by
any other process. (P) only places a constraint on the vocabulary employed by
the theorist in describing ordinary agents. If ordinary speakers who intend X by
uttering e are not required to make any mental replacements of this kind then, a
fortiori, they do not need to make an innite number of them. It is clear, however,
that the example Wittgenstein uses to illustrate (T) does invite the charge of a
possible vicious regress. The theory that intending red by uttering ‘red’ consists
in imagining a further symbol, say a red patch, clearly leads to a vicious regress as
any imagined symbol must also be intended in some way. One must understand
that the red image is indeed red and intend it as a representation of red.
Second, Wittgenstein hints at what I will call the No replacement argument. He
imagines that we might just stipulate the level at which the intention itself resides
and, so, avert the innite regress.7 Suppose then that the intention-symbol is only
7BB, 34: ‘But adopt whatever model or scheme you may, it will have a bottom level, and there
will be no such thing as an interpretation of that.’
Behaviourism and regress arguments 6
one step below the linguistic symbol which is uttered. Wittgenstein asserts that
the replacement expression e′ would have to be equivalent to the intention with
which the person makes her utterance: ‘Now I assume that you take the meaning
to be a process accompanying the saying, and that it is translatable into, and so
far equivalent to, a further sign’ (BB, 34). But he has also made the assumption
that any expression can be intended in dierent ways on dierent occasions. We
might add that although intentions themselves can indeed be intended in dierent
ways, for example, I can either intend or not intend to make you aware of some
intention of mine, that is clearly dierent from having a single expression and
intending dierent things by it on dierent occasions. Thus, Wittgenstein con-
cludes, expressions cannot be equivalent to intentions and no symbol can replace
an intention.
There is, however, a sense in which ‘replacement’ is sometimes acceptable. This
is in those special cases when a speaker intends X by uttering e and X happens to
be some further linguistic expression. Consider the following. One might intend
to communicate that it’s raining in New York by uttering (1) while in New York (cf.
Perry 1986).
(1) It’s raining.
But it does not follow that the speaker thereby also intended to communicate
sentence (2) by uttering (1).
(2) It’s raining in New York.
Yet she might very well have intended this very sentence by some other utterance.
Thus, if sentence (2) is the speaker’s favourite sentence, she could have said ‘My
favourite sentence is true’ and thereby this very sentence would be (part of) her
intention. The relation between (1) and (2) is best described by saying that both can
be uttered to express (roughly) the same proposition on dierent occasions. But
it does not follow that one expression is intended while the other is uttered. This
point seems to be supported by Wittgenstein’s related discussion in PI §§19–20
(cf. Goldfarb 1983).
In terms of Wittgenstein’s example in the BB, when the pointing gesture is
intended in the usual way the gesture is not intended to refer to another pointing
gesture that is equivalent to the one actually performed. Still, such a feat might be
accomplished by referring to, say, one’s favourite sentence—that is, if the uttered
sentence is identical to the favourite sentence. However, the intention can be rep-
resented by some additional expression or gesture and thus, to that extent, satises
(P). My intention to communicate that it’s raining in New York by uttering (1) may
be represented by (2) without the intention thereby being ‘equivalent’ to (2). This
conclusion seems trivial since my intention can also be ‘represented’ in a dierent
language from the language actually spoken.
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There are at least two ways to go from here. Either one accepts eliminative
behaviourism or just rejects (P). Some may think that Wittgenstein is an elimi-
nativist about intentions but that is clearly false. He thinks the two arguments
above reveal something important about mentalistic concepts such intention and
understanding, but it is not that these words refer to nothing (cf. PI, §304). Thus, he
rejects (P), but he might still accept some weaker analogue. Intending something by
an expression just cannot be equivalent to a further expression that occurs in the
imagination ‘while’ one has an intention. My occurrent thoughts are not, as such,
determinative of my intention in speaking.8 More specically, such thoughts do
not determine the meaning of an expression on the occasion of utterance. Arguing
against such a theory is one of Wittgenstein’s major concerns in the Investigations.
And the negative point remains true even if a further symbol can represent the
intention in some other sense. This lends support to Wittgenstein’s claim in Zettel
that intention is ‘neither an emotion, a mood, nor yet a sensation or image. It is
not a state of consciousness. It does not have genuine duration’ (Z, §45).
More generally, then, Wittgenstein can plausibly be construed as arguing that
intentions belong in the larger category of nonepisodic mental states. A typical
example of such a state is standing belief. You are probably not actively enter-
taining the belief that houses exist, but you would assent to it upon being asked.
This belief is a nonepisodic standing belief of yours. It is plausible to claim that
expecting, wanting, knowing and intending are similarly nonepisodic in nature.
Or, at least, that they are sometimes mental episodes but sometimes not. But then
intention does not necessarily consist in conscious mental episodes. In his ‘middle’
or ‘transition’ period—roughly 1929–1933—Wittgenstein writes:
By ‘intention’ I mean here what uses a sign in a thought. The inten-
tion seems to interpret, to give the nal interpretation; which is not
a further sign or picture, but something else, the thing that cannot be
further interpreted. (PG, 145; Z, §231)
It seems clear, then, that Wittgenstein was an intentionalist about representation
as early as the BB, where he writes that ‘[a]n obvious, and correct, answer to the
question “What makes a portrait the portrait of so-and-so”? is that it is the intention’
(BB, 32, emphasis in original; cf. PG, 102; PPF, §§17–18; LW I, §318). By analogy,
I think, he should have said that only the intention of the speaker S makes it the
8I use ‘as such’ to hedge the claim. Here is how I would describe the case more fully (this is
not what Wittgenstein would say): the fact that some thought T is occurrent in my mind while I
utter e intending X does not imply that T determines my intention. But this is simply because one
can have many (episodic or nonepisodic) thoughts at roughly the same time. Thus when I utter
‘This is blue’ while a green image crosses my mind, the green image does not make it the case that
I really meant this is green rather than this is blue. But it does not follow that no conscious thought
of mine determined the content of my intention. One can insist that I was also having an occurrent
thought about blue—it is just that this thought did not consist in a mental representation as of a
blue image.
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case that by uttering, say, ‘she’ S means one contextually salient woman rather
than another (cf. PI, §§661–663). And if the intention is unclear to the audience,
the speaker can be asked to clarify her meaning. The ‘use’ and the ‘context’ of use
are merely of epistemological value: they serve as tools for the hearer to discover
what the speaker intends.
3 Meaning and use
Let us turn to use-based semantics. When Wittgenstein writes, in PI §43, that for
a large class of cases the meaning of a word can be explained by describing its
use, this should only be taken as a reminder of the variety of linguistic practices
the countenancing of which the Augustinian picture of language discourages. It
is not reasonable to argue that Wittgenstein intends the remark as a theory of the
semantics of natural language. Many theorists, however, have construed it in such
a manner. There are three main reasons for not doing this.
First, an explanation of a meaning can refer to almost anything, depending on
the epistemic state of the one in need of an explanation.9 Generally, the fact in
virtue of which p is the case does not have to be mentioned when one explains to
someone that p is the case. Therefore, the alleged fact that the use of expression e
is often cited in explanations of the meaning of e does not show that use is that in
virtue of which e has its meaning. To illustrate, the fact in virtue of which Paris is
the capital of France is usually not cited when the fact that Paris is the capital of
France is explained to the uninformed. The former refers to a complex historical
event while the latter can be, for example, the act of pointing to Paris on a map.
Second, the individuation of uses is a complete mess.10 Take neologisms. Until
a neologism is rst uttered it does not have a use. Thus when one explains a ne-
ologism one cannot be explaining its (actual) use in the language. A use-theorist
will reply that one is explaining how one will use the new term. But the problem
is exacerbated when we move to whole sentences. As Chomsky pointed out, most
sentences of English will never be used. This follows from the fact that the sen-
tences are innitely many, because of recursion. And how can use then determine
9This does not go against Wittgenstein’s injunction that the meaning will be what the expla-
nation of the meaning explains—for that is a mere platitude (BB, 1).
10It is not noted often enough that Wittgenstein deleted a few sentences from PI §41 where he
aired a similar worry:
Vielleicht wäre es richtiger zu sagen: Eine Bedeutung eines Wortes ist eine Art
seines Gebrauchs in der Sprache. Hier ist die Frage oen gelassen, was wir einen
einheitlichen Gebrauch, und was einen doppelten nennen werden. Ich glaube es
wird sich zeigen, daß sich dafür keine scharfgeschnittenen Regeln angeben lassen.
(Cf. Baker and Hacker 2005b: 121)
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the meaning of these sentences?11 These remarks should remind us of how unclear
the notion really is: Which use are we describing? The overall past use of the term,
with which no nite mind could be familiar? One’s personal use of the term? The
use to which one is putting the term at some particular occasion? The uses one
remembers? The future use of the term? The ‘correct’ use? The list is endless.
These worries are mentioned here to give some idea of the diculties involved
in the picture of meaning as use. Of course there are numerous authors who
have developed this idea further and tried to give answers to the most pressing
questions.12 Here, however, I want to argue that the major problem Wittgenstein
saw in use-based semantics was a very simple one, although orthodox interpre-
tations underestimate the extent to which it worried him (e.g. Baker and Hacker
2005a: chap. 17).
In PI §138, Wittgenstein writes that ‘we understand the meaning of a word
when we hear or say it; we grasp the meaning at a stroke, and what we grasp in this
way is surely something dierent from the ‘use’ which is extended in time!’ This
gives rise to a paradox. If the meaning of e is the use of e then understanding the
meaning of e is identical to understanding its use. But since speakers and hearers
apparently understand meanings immediately they must, according to the theory,
understand ‘at a stroke’ all the ways in which an expression should be or has been
used, depending on the details of the theory one pursues. Sellars’ inferential-role
semantics, for example, faces the exact same problem: ‘the conceptual meaning
of a descriptive term is constituted by what can be inferred from it in accordance
with the logical and extra-logical rules of inference of the language (conceptual
frame) to which it belongs’ (1953: 136). Since the use or role of the expression
includes extra-logical inferences, the information one must possess in order to
understand a simple term amounts to a vast encyclopaedia-like entry. For instance,
‘This is a horse’ allows the extra-logical inference ‘This is an animal’ and many
more. But how could one grasp such vast amounts of information ‘at a stroke’ as
Wittgenstein puts it?
In PI §§138–139 and RFM §130, Wittgenstein clearly commits himself to the
idea that people ‘grasp the whole use of a word’ at a stroke. His major concern, as
John McDowell (1980: 223) puts it in a closely related context, is a certain seductive
misconception of this innocent phrase. The misconception says that at-a-stroke
understanding is an episodic mental state which determines the correct usage of
the expression. This kind of mental state is a philosopher’s myth, on Wittgenstein’s
account. To illustrate, he uses the example of ‘cube’ and claims that having a mental
image of a cube cannot be a state from which correct use of the expression ‘cube’
emanates: having such an image appear before one’s mind’s eye as it were is not
sucient for understanding or correctly using the expression (PI, §139).
Wittgenstein argues that grasping the meaning of an expression at a stroke
11For discussion, see Lewis (1992) and Schier (1993).
12Cf. Horwich (1998: chap. 3 and citations therein).
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does not guarantee that one’s future application of that expression will be correct.
Sometimes we make mistakes, and we also need to make room for entirely novel
yet legitimate understandings of expressions. Consider his example of an instructor
who teaches a student the mathematical rule ‘add 2’ (PI, §§185–188). The instructor
gives examples and tells the student to go on in the same way. The student may
have a moment of immediate understanding and start writing the series ‘2, 4, 6,
8 . . . ’ until he reaches 1,000. Suppose that he then writes ‘1004, 1008, 1012 . . . ’.
Certainly, this kind of situation is exceptionally improbable. Yet we seem justied
in thinking that the instructor actually meant that the student was to write ‘1002,
1004, 1006 . . . ’ and not ‘1004, 1008, 1012 . . . ’. But does this imply that she must
have thought of the former series and not of the latter? Well, both series might
have crossed her mind; but surely that would be irrelevant. Clearly, the instructor
did not think the whole series through, because it is innite, but she undeniably
meant the whole innite series. How can this be? Did her mind ‘enter hyperspace’
and catch a glimpse of every step in the series from there? No. But this goes to
show that intending and meaning are very dierent from thinking, that is, they
are, again, nonepisodic mental states, rather than mental ‘activities’ (PI, §693). As
Wittgenstein stresses, he is not denying the idea that understanding is some kind
of state of the person. He is denying the notion that such a state can somehow
contain all future moves in advance.
The substantial point here is as follows. The problem of understanding at a
stroke is only a problem for those who do not distinguish clearly between what
a speaker means by an utterance on an occasion and what the sentence uttered
means in the speaker’s language. The distinction is a fundamental tenet of inten-
tionalism and some interpreters have lamented discreetly that it evaded Wittgen-
stein’s genius (e.g. Baker and Hacker 2005a: 73). If my argument in this paper
is right, however, the distinction was not completely lost on him. One point of
the rule-following considerations is to show that there is a type of understanding
without interpretation. And this is the understanding of what the speaker means in-
dependent of what rules or conventions govern the expressions uttered—for such
things cannot be understood at a stroke. For obvious reasons, Wittgenstein did not
oer the distinction in the form of an explanatory theory, but, as I argue further
below, it still played a foundational role in his overall picture of linguistic meaning.
4 The psychology of meaning
Anyone who reads Wittgenstein carefully will notice a tension between two types
of remarks he makes about linguistic meaning. A nice illustration can be found in
the Brown Book (BB, 114):
[W]hen we ask a doctor ‘Can the patient walk?’, we shall sometimes
be ready to substitute for this ‘Is his leg healed?’—‘Can he speak?’
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under circumstances means ‘Is his throat all right?’, under others (e.g.,
if he is a small child) it means ‘Has he learned to speak?’
Wittgenstein makes a similar point about the ‘circumstances’ of an utterance in
many other places. But it is dicult to see how a use-based theory of meaning can
accommodate this point. More specically, if individuating the use or meaning of
expression e depends on something further, that is, ‘circumstances’ or ‘contexts’,
it seems like the use is not doing any important theoretical work anymore. How
many uses does the sentence (a) ‘Can he speak?’ have? Wittgenstein’s list is obvi-
ously not exhaustive. It could also be substituted for (b) ‘Is this robot a speaking
robot?’ or (c) ‘Has he stopped grieving and started talking to his family?’ But it
would be preposterous to say that (a), (b) and (c) all have the same use. And if one
insists that they have the same use, but only in this particular context, then one
must explain how the context does this such that ‘use’ remains the fundamental
explanatory notion.
This is something, or so I suggest, Wittgenstein was sensitive to when he claims
that meanings can be determined by contexts—especially when he was concerned
with the distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘philosophical’ contexts (PI, §116). The
claim, however, that contexts are determinative raises more questions than it an-
swers. And this fact has been explored in quite some detail in the contemporary
literature on contextualism in the philosophy of language. Without going into
detail, one question is the following: in what sense can context ‘determine’ the
meaning of an expression? On reection it appears that context cannot be consti-
tutive of or even partly constitutive of the meaning of an expression. The context
can only determine meaning in the epistemological sense that the hearer can use
the context in order to gure out what the meaning is or what the speaker intends
on this occasion (cf. Bach 2005; Neale 2005). This is clear in the cases imagined in
(a), (b) and (c) above.
The only fact that can ground meaning in the sense of constituting it is the
intention of the speaker. The meaning of ‘Can he speak?’ on a particular occasion
is determined by the intention of the speaker when she makes this utterance.
The context cannot assume control over the speaker and determine her meaning
for her. Consider, for example, slips of the tongue. If I intend to refer to Gunnar
but accidentally utter ‘Mike’ my intention is not retroactively altered. Of course,
I am responsible for making the error in performance and this can have legal
consequences and whatnot, but my intention itself cannot change on account of
the slip. Furthermore, in a given context the hearer can easily be aware that the
speaker meant to refer to Gunnar although he uttered ‘Mike’ and not ‘Gunnar’.
If one considers Wittgenstein’s notes published as Remarks on the Philosophy
of Psychology II (RPP II), he ends up making essentially this point. And the last
two remarks in the Investigations (§§692–693) point in the same direction: we are
misled by supercial similarities of grammatical form and imagine that ‘meaning’
is similar to ‘thinking’. But when one means and intends, say, that the student is
The psychology of meaning 12
to write ‘4302’ after ‘4300’—although one merely gave expression to the general
rule ‘add 2’—this meaning cannot consist in having thought of this particular step.
Or any particular step. But the meaning of the utterance is still constituted by the
speaker’s nonepisodic intention in producing it. RPP II is from a typescript dictated
in late 1948, based on manuscripts written between November 1947 and August
1948. It is generally agreed that the Investigations—at least what was formerly
known as ‘Part I’—had acquired more or less its nal form by June 1945. Here is
the rst paragraph of RPP II §176:
If I say that I am using the words ‘I’m in pain’, ‘I’m looking for’, etc.
etc. as a piece of information, not as a natural sound, [Footnote: Var.
‘not as a natural sound, but rather to communicate something, as a
report’.] then this characterizes my intention. For instance, I might
want somebody to react to this in a certain way.
Wittgenstein is suggesting, it seems, a distinction between using expressions as (i)
natural sounds and to (ii) communicate information. Call the latter the ‘communica-
tive’ use of an expression. Describing the use in this way is to characterise one’s
intention, apparently the speaker’s intention to induce a specic reaction in the
audience. ‘Natural sounds’, however, are a piece of instinctive verbal behaviour not
prompted by the speaker’s expectation that it will have specic eects on some per-
son. Wittgenstein clearly assumes that a sentence like ‘I’m in pain’ can be uttered,
presumably on dierent occasions, both as a natural sound and to communicate
information. It is not to my purpose to discuss his controversial notion of ‘avowal’
or Äußerung or whether ‘I’m in pain’ can be an example of such utterances (see
e.g. Bar-On 2004; Finkelstein 2003; Moran 2001). In PI §244, he writes that it is
possible that words—words referring to sensations in particular—are ‘connected
with the primitive, natural, expression of sensation and used in their place’. Rene-
ments aside, however, it is at least reasonable to think that some utterance-types,
crying and moaning for instance, are closer to being ‘natural sounds’ than ‘pieces
of information’.
These ideas bear a startling resemblance to the basic insights of the Gricean
programme in contemporary philosophy of language. In Grice’s original denition
of ‘non-natural meaning’ (i.e. meaningNN) he writes: ‘“A meantNN something by x”
is (roughly) equivalent to “A intended the utterance of x to produce some eect
in an audience by means of a recognition of this intention”’ (Grice 1957: 385).
This denition spawned a vast literature on ‘communicative intentions’ which
are characterized, as Wittgenstein does above, in terms of the speaker wanting to
produce some cognitive eect in the hearer (e.g. Neale 1992; Wilson and Sperber
2012). Consequently, contemporary Gricean pragmatics and speech-act theory is
much closer to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language than often is assumed
(cf. Carruthers 1996; Hacker 2010; Haning 2000). If my exegesis is accurate this
can already be gleaned from Wittgenstein’s rejection of use-theoretic semantics in
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the Investigations. Furthermore, Grice’s 1982 paper, ‘Meaning Revisited’ is largely
devoted to spelling out how an instinctive cry—occurring as a mere natural sound—
can evolve into more sophisticated forms of communication along with a creature’s
increased intelligence and memory (see Scott-Phillips 2015, §4.7 for discussion).
Two more remarks in RPP II are of particular interest here. First, Wittgenstein
writes:
What is important is that we intend something when we utter a word.
For example, I say ‘Bank!’ and want thereby to remind someone to
go to the bank, and intend ‘bank’ in the one meaning and not in the
other.—But intention is no experience. (§242)
This is evidence that the ground of a contextual or circumstantial dierence in
meaning is the speaker’s intention; the intention is ‘what is important’. The am-
biguity of ‘bank’ provides a perfect example for illustration, as contemporary
Griceans are prone to point out. Humans are intention-recognition machines and
are not much concerned with the ‘literal’ or ‘minimal’ meaning of sentences—if
there is such a thing (cf. PI, §648, also Sperber and Wilson 2005).13
Second, in the next paragraph RPP II §176 Wittgenstein rightly acknowledges
that he still owes ‘an explanation of the concept of intention’ but he provides a
starting point for an explanation when he later remarks: ‘Intention can be called
a mental disposition’ (RPP II, §178). But it is a very special kind of disposition in
that one does not perceive the disposition within oneself as a matter of experience.
Thus it is, Wittgenstein thinks, quite dierent from having an inclination towards
jealousy—which one may recognize from repeated instances of jealousy (RPP II,
§178). The suggestion does, however, make sense of his insistence that intention
cannot be any type of experience and thus it cannot be equivalent to a symbol
used in thought. It can only be what uses a sign in thought and gives the nal
interpretation (cf. §2 above).
13In RPP II §245, Wittgenstein writes:
That it is possible after all to utter the word in isolation, far removed from any
intention, ‘now with one meaning, now with another’, is a phenomenon which has
no bearing on the nature of meaning; as if one could say, ‘Look, you can do this with
a meaning too’.—No more than one could say: ‘Look at all the things you can do with
an apple: you can eat it, see it, desire it, try to form an image of it.’ No more than it
is characteristic of the concept ‘needle’ and ‘soul’ that we can ask how many souls
can t on the point of a needle.—We’re dealing here, so to speak, with an outgrowth
of the concept.
I understand this as saying that the ‘core’ of the concept of meaning is intentional. What is im-
portant is that one intends something by uttering an expression and that the concept is thereby
expressed. One does not latch on to the concept itself by exploring simply what can be done with
it regardless of the speaker’s actual intention.
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Here is how I understand Wittgenstein’s suggestion. The fact that ‘bank’ means
‘nancial institution’ rather than ‘river bank’ on some occasion of utterance is ex-
plained by the speaker’s intention in uttering, or in using, the expression. The
intention itself is grounded in a mental disposition, that is, the speaker has a dis-
position to utter the expression with this particular communicative intention. She
may also have a disposition to utter the same expression with another intention,
for example, the intention to refer to a river bank. The speaker also believes, in the
normal case, that the hearer has a related mental disposition, enabling the hearer to
interpret the expression correctly on a particular occasion, using contextual cues
and background information. If the speaker did not have this belief she would not
be able to even form the intention in question. The reason for this is that Griceans,
like Wittgenstein, think there are doxastic constraints on intention formation. The
general idea is simply that one cannot intend to V if one in fact thinks that it is
highly improbable that one will be able to V. And this is why, as in Wittgenstein’s
example, one is not able to utter ‘bububu’ and mean ‘If it doesn’t rain, I shall go
for a walk’ (PI, boxed remark between §35 and §36). Unless the context is a very
odd one, the speaker will not believe that it is possible to utter ‘bububu’ with that
communicative intention. As Wittgenstein also stresses (PI, §337), intentions are
embedded in a setting, in human customs and institutions:
If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend
to play a game of chess. To the extent that I do intend the construction
of an English sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact
that I can speak English.14
Thus the so-called Humpty Dumpty objection does not tell against intention-based
semantics: one cannot intend to mean whatever by whatever whenever.15
5 Conclusion: The immediacy of understanding
What people understand immediately or at a stroke is the intention with which a
symbol is produced. The intention is not identical or equivalent to any linguistic
expression and, a fortiori, not equivalent to the use of an expression. Of course
there are dierent ways to go here and diculties raised by each option. This is
no place to weigh in on that debate. The general idea, however, is that a hearer H
understands immediately the speaker’s intention to produce a specic response
in H. The response can be, for example, to form the belief that it’s raining in Reyk-
javík. English speakers, then, are disposed to produce this response by uttering the
14Glock (1996: 182), interprets PI §§614–616 along these lines also—but this is quite dubious.
For discussion see, for example, Donnellan (1968); Bratman (1984); Mele (2001).
15For the Humpty Dumpty objection, see Donnellan (1968); Unnsteinsson (2014).
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expression ‘It’s raining’ while they are in Reykjavík and believe that the hearer is
aware of this.
The connection between rule-following and linguistic understanding in Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy has been overemphasized by commentators. The ability to fol-
low rules is merely analogous to the ability to understand linguistic expressions
and does not explain it.16 Also, rule-following should be construed in terms of
learning rather than understanding. In uttering a linguistic expression e, a speaker
usually does not intend to teach the audience how to use e. This only happens in
special cases and there is even little reason to suppose that this is how children
learn their rst language. Furthermore, learning how to use an expression is not
something that happens ‘at a stroke’—although this is surely conceivable. In or-
dinary communication speakers utter expressions e such that they have a prior
expectation that the audience is familiar with e and can thus use the fact that e was
uttered as evidence for the speaker’s intention. There is no need to suppose that
the hearer must ‘understand’ the whole use of e, at a stroke or otherwise, in order
to infer the intention of the speaker. Minimally, we can assume that the hearer
may need to process stored information about what speakers in some group are
generally disposed to communicate by uttering e in particular contexts.
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